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Abstract
In 2012, JPMorgan accumulated a USD 6.2 billion loss on a credit derivatives portfolio,
the so-called “London Whale”, partly as a consequence of de-correlations of non-perfectly
correlated positions that were supposed to hedge each other. Motivated by this case, we
devise a factor model for correlations that allows for scenario-based stress testing of cor-
relations. We derive a number of analytical results related to a portfolio of homogeneous
assets. Using the concept of Mahalanobis distance, we show how to identify adverse sce-
narios of correlation risk. In addition, we demonstrate how correlation and volatility stress
tests can be combined. As an example, we apply the factor-model approach to the “London
Whale” portfolio and determine the value-at-risk impact from correlation changes. Since our
findings are particularly relevant for large portfolios, where even small correlation changes
can have a large impact, a further application would be to stress test portfolios of central
counterparties, which are of systemically relevant size.
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1 Introduction
Diversification – typically captured by correlation – lies at the heart of many financial applica-
tions: a diversified portfolio is less risky than a concentrated portfolio; hedging strategies may
involve only imperfectly correlated assets instead of perfect substitutes. It is well-known that
correlations are not constant over time and may be strongly affected by specific events (Karolyi
and Stulz, 1996; Longin and Solnik, 2001; Ang and Bekaert, 2002; Wied et al., 2012; Pu and
Zhao, 2012; Adams et al., 2017). Changes in correlation may lead to potentially unexpected or
unquantified losses, see e.g. LTCM (Jorion, 2000), Amaranth Advisors (Chincarini, 2007).
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This paper develops a technique for generating correlation matrices from specific risk factor
scenarios. The method allows to challenge diversification benefits in a realistic way by quan-
tifying potential losses from correlation changes or a correlation break-down due to various
scenarios. Consequently, worst-case scenarios and their impact can be identified. Quantifying
these risks is particularly important if a portfolio or a hedging strategy may be adversely affected
by a correlation breakdown amongst the portfolio constituents. For example, hedging strategies
involving non-perfect substitutes, such as a stock portfolio and index futures for hedging, are
sensitive to correlation changes and thus vulnerable to adverse correlation scenarios.
The technique borrows elements from parameterising correlation matrices in interest rate
modelling, e.g. Rebonato (2002); Brigo (2002); Schoenmakers and Coffey (2003). These pa-
rameterisations have in common that the degree of correlation depends on the difference in
maturity of the underlying interest rates (e.g. swap rates). In its simplest form, correlations
are determined by e−β|i−j|, where β > 0 is a constant parameter, and i, j are maturities. This
captures the stylised fact that correlations decay with increasing maturity difference.
In this paper, this approach is generalised by defining factors that characterise differences
in the assets under consideration, and by parameterising correlations via “distances” capturing
these differences. The parameters themselves can be calibrated for example from historical data.
Scenarios are generated by varying the parameters, where an increase in a parameter captures
a de-correlation related to a factor.
The method is capable of identifying the factor structure of worst case scenarios. More
specifically, given the mapping of correlation risk factor to risk measure, one can find the global
maximum of the risk measure and infer the corresponding risk factor scenario. As each parame-
ter represents an economically relevant correlation risk factor, it is therefore possible to identify
critical portfolio structures that might require particular attention from a risk management
perspective.
Aside from the impact of a given scenario, one is also interested in the plausibility of the
chosen scenarios. This can be implemented by assigning a joint probability distribution to the
correlation parameters in order to define a constraint for correlation scenarios. In this paper,
the constraint is specified via the so-called Mahalanobis distance, which measures the distance
of a normally distributed random vector from the center of the distribution.
As correlation stress often occurs jointly with volatility shocks, we also demonstrate how to
combine the two stress scenarios. To model volatility separately we assume that asset returns
follow a multivariate Student t-distribution (as opposed to a normal distribution). As a t-
distribution can be conveniently decomposed into a correlated normal distribution component
and an inverse-gamma-distributed scaling factor, volatility stress is introduced by setting the
scaling factor to a given quantile.
To demonstrate the technique, correlation stress tests are applied to the portfolio of the
so-called “London Whale”, a term used in the finance industry to denote a USD 6.2 billion
loss in 2012 of a credit derivative portfolio run by JPMorgan. In late 2011, in an effort to
reduce the risk of the position without monetising losses, the notional amount of the portfolio
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was increased, while relying on the ability of similar credit index positions to act as hedges for
each other (JPMorgan, 2013; United-States-Senate, 2013b). Our analysis shows that correlation
scenarios and stress tests reveal the high riskiness of this portfolio and thus might have led to
a more appropriate risk assessment of the portfolio.1
A further application where correlation scenario and stress testing can reveal inherent risks
is the practice of so-called “portfolio margining” in initial margin calculations of clearing houses.
Here, netting of offsetting positions reduces the margin requirement. However, when positions
are not perfect hedges, but only highly correlated, an adverse correlation scenario could lead to
substantial margin calls, thereby increasing counterparty risk at a systematic level.
The literature on establishing correlation stress tests is scarce, even though it is well es-
tablished that correlations are not constant over time and may be strongly affected by specific
events (Longin and Solnik, 2001; Wied et al., 2012; Pu and Zhao, 2012). Adams et al. (2017)
observe that correlations vary over time and, in addition, experience level shifts and struc-
tural breaks that occur in response to economic or financial shocks. Krishnan et al. (2009)
and Mueller et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that investors demand a correlation risk
premium, which is related to the uncertainty about future correlation changes. Buraschi et al.
(2010) develop a framework for inter-temporal portfolio choice that includes hedging compo-
nents against correlation risk.
The prominent role of correlation in financial portfolios led to regulatory agencies calling
for risk model stress tests that account for ”significant shifts in correlations” (BCBS, 2006,
p. 207 ff.). However, there is little literature on parametric correlation modelling, in particular
related to risk-factor driven stress testing: aside from challenges of mathematical consistency in
correlation modelling (correlation matrices must be positive semi-definite, see e.g. Qi and Sun
(2010); Ng et al. (2014) for solutions to this problem), the specification of stressful yet plausible
scenarios for correlations is far from straightforward.
The selection of plausible scenarios poses a challenge in the development of stress testing
methods in general. The use of historical or hypothetical scenarios is problematic, as the
probability and thus the plausibility of a scenario is typically unknown, while at the same
time relevant scenarios might be neglected. In an extensive study, Alexander and Sheedy
(2008a) compare various well-known models in their ability to conduct meaningful stress tests.
Glasserman et al. (2015) develop an empirical likelihood approach for the selection of stress
scenarios, with a focus on reverse stress testing. Kopeliovich et al. (2015) present a reverse
stress testing method to determine scenarios that lead to a specified loss level. Breuer et al.
(2009) and Flood and Korenko (2015) use the Mahalanobis distances to select scenarios from a
multivariate distribution of risk factors.
Breuer and Csisza´r (2013) extend these approaches and consider various application sce-
narios, amongst them stressed default correlations, which refer to the correlations of Bernoulli
variables denoting the default or survival of loans or obligors. Studer (1999) considers corre-
lation breakdowns by identifying the worst-case correlation scenario in a constrained region of
1Other risks specific to the “London Whale”, especially concerning the size of the position relative to market
size, are treated in Cont and Wagalath (2016).
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P&L scenarios. However, solving the problem turns out to be intractable in the sense that it is
NP-hard. Also, the likelihood or plausibility of such a correlation scenario is not known. The
difference in our setting is that we model correlation itself in a parametric way and – imposing
a distribution assumption on the risk factors driving correlation, e.g. calibrated from historical
data – find the risk-factor scenario that produces the worst loss within a given range of plausible
correlation scenarios.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the correlation stress testing
methodology alongside analytical results for both, the stress test and scenario selection proce-
dures. Section 3 consists of a concise review of the “London Whale” case as well as the results
from correlation stress testing the credit portfolio using the methods developed in the previous
section. Section 4 concludes. A detailed review of the London Whale case is provided as an
online appendix at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210536.
2 Correlation parameterisation and stress testing
2.1 Factor model
The principal idea behind the correlation parameterisation developed in this paper is to split
portfolio correlations into dependence contributions associated with several risk factors. With
each risk factor a parameter determining the degree of de-correlation on the overall correlation
is associated. Calibrating these parameters and then adjusting them allows to translate specific
economic scenarios into changes on correlations.
More precisely, let C be an n× n-correlation matrix (i.e., positive semi-definite, symmetric,
with entries in [−1, 1], and ones on the diagonal) related to the returns of n financial instruments.
In the context of the London Whale position analysed later, the entries of C are the correlations
of credit index spread returns and related tranche spread returns.2 In the London Whale case
these are typically positive (with only few exceptions near zero, which are set to a small positive
constant), and generally we assume that all correlations are in (0, 1].
The factors that determine the correlations are denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xm)′. In the context
of the London Whale position, the factors include the maturity, the index series, a dummy
variable determining whether the security is investment grade or not, and others. Further choices
could be factors relating to geographical regions, industries or balance sheet data. Correlations
cij of securities i and j are modelled as
cij = exp
(−(β1|x1i − x1j |+ β2|x2i − x2j |+ · · ·+ βm|xmi − xmj |)) , i, j = 1, . . . , n,
with β1, . . . , βm positive coefficients, the parameters. This is the simplest, most parsimonious
functional form relating differences in the risk factors with the correlations of the securities. It
implies that the greater the distance |xki −xkj |, the greater the de-correlation amongst the securi-
ties i and j. If two instruments are identical in all respects, then they are assigned a correlation
2In this setting correlations are not implied tranche correlations, which are used for pricing, but historical
spread return correlations, as would be used in risk management.
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of 1. With additional information about the relationship between risk factors and correlations,
other, more complex functional forms may be feasible. Similar approaches to parameterising
correlation matrices are common in interest-rate modelling, see e.g. Schoenmakers and Coffey
(2003); Rebonato (2004); Brigo and Mercurio (2006).
In the simple model above, given historical returns, the parameters β1, . . . , βm are easily
determined by standard regression techniques such as OLS on the transformed correlations
− ln(cij). A scenario such as “the correlation between investment grade and high-yield securities
decreases” is then implemented by increasing the corresponding β-parameter. With parameters
calibrated on a regular basis, the parameter history can be used to obtain reasonable scenarios.
2.2 Stress testing a homogeneous portfolio
To better understand the stress testing effect we consider a stylised, homogeneous portfolio and
derive closed formulas for the impact of various correlation stress test scenarios. A homogeneous
portfolio reduces the number of parameters involved to a minimum and therefore allows for a
general understanding of the behaviour under stress. This is similar to analysing diversification
effects of a homogeneous portfolio in standard Markowitz portfolio theory.
The setup is as follows: the m risk factors are binary in the sense that they express prop-
erties that are either present or absent in a security. The number of securities is n = 2m
and they exhibit all 2m combinations of risk factor combinations (for example, one could set
(1{x1i 6=x1j}, . . . ,1{xmi 6=xmj }) = (i− 1)⊕ (j − 1), with (i− 1)⊕ (j − 1) the bitwise XOR operator of
the binary representations of i− 1 and j − 1). As a consequence, no two securities are equal in
terms of their risk factor exposure. The securities all have equal volatility, and the portfolio is
equally-weighted. However, as a consequence of choosing binary risk factor combinations, the
correlations are not homogeneous.
We assume that risk of the portfolio is measured by value-at-risk (VaR) in a variance-
covariance approach, i.e.,
VaRα = −N1−α · V0 · (wᵀ Σ w)1/2 , (1)
where N1−α denotes the (1 − α)-quantile of the standard normal distribution, V0 denotes the
current position value, w is the vector of portfolio weights and Σ denotes the covariance matrix
of the portfolio components’ returns with entries σ2 along the diagonal denoting the stand-alone
variances of the assets. In this setting we assume that the expected return is zero, which is a
reasonable assumption for short time horizons.
The normal distribution assumption can easily be generalised, e.g. to a Student t-distri-
bution. We will use this more generalised setup in Section 2.3 when we combine correlation and
volatility stress testing.
Proposition 1. The portfolio variance is given by
wᵀ Σ w =
σ2
n
m∏
k=1
(
1 + e−βk
)
, (2)
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The average correlation amongst pairwise different asset returns is
ρ(β) =
1
(n− 1)
m∏
k=1
(
1 + e−βk
)
− 1
n− 1 . (3)
Proof. Assuming without loss of generality that the bitwise XOR operator described above
defines the value of the indicator variables, the portfolio variance simplifies to
wᵀ Σ w =
1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
e
−∑mk=1 βk·1{xk
i
6=xk
j
}σ2
=
σ2
n2
n∑
i=1
n/2∑
j=1
e
−∑m−1k=1 βk·1{xk
i
6=xk
j
}−βm·0 +
n∑
j=n/2+1
e
−∑m−1k=1 βk·1{xk
i
6=xk
j
}−βm·1

=
σ2
n2
n∑
i=1
(
1 + e−βm
)
·
n/2∑
j=1
e
−∑m−1k=1 βk·1{xk
i
6=xk
j
} .
Iterating this calculation m = log2 n times gives
wᵀ Σ w =
σ2
n2
n∑
i=1
m∏
k=1
(
1 + e−βk
)
=
σ2
n
m∏
k=1
(
1 + e−βk
)
.
The average correlation is given as
1
n(n− 1)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
e
−∑mk=1 βk·1{xk
i
6=xk
j
} =
1
n(n− 1)
 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1,
e
−∑mk=1 βk·1{xk
i
6=xk
j
} −
n∑
i=1
1
 ,
and the claim follows from the first part of the Proposition.
Corollary 2. The sensitivity of the variance with respect to a single β-factor βl is
∂wᵀΣw
∂βl
= −σ
2
n2
e−βl ·
∏
k 6=l
(
1 + e−βk
)
.
If the β-factors are homogeneous, i.e., β1 = · · · = βm = β, then the overall sensitivity is
∂wᵀΣw
∂β
=
∂ σ
2
n2
(
1 + e−β
)m
∂β
= −σ
2
n
m
(
1 + e−β
)m
1 + eβ
.
For stress testing we associate a probability distribution with β. This allows to formulate
scenarios in probabilistic terms and determine their impact. We assume that the risk factors
themselves are homogeneous, i.e., βk = β, for all k = 1, . . . ,m, and that changes in the risk
factor coefficients ∆β are jointly normally distributed, each one with mean 0 and variance σ2β
and with correlations ρβ.
Following e.g. Kupiec (1998), we define a stress scenario on one set of (“core”) risk factors
and, assuming that the given covariance matrix is unaltered by the stress scenario, set the
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Figure 1: Top left: Portfolio VaR as a function of the number of risk factors m (cf. Proposition 1).
Top right: Change in portfolio VaR as a function of ∆β (cf. Proposition 1), calibrated to different
initial average asset correlations ρ ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}. Bottom left: Change in portfolio VaR as a function
of ∆β with peripheral risk factor changes that correlate with ρβ = 0.5 (cf. Proposition 2). Bottom
right: Change in portfolio VaR as a function of ∆β with correlated peripheral risk factor changes (cf.
Proposition 3). All graphs show a 99% Value-at-Risk, and the initial and unstressed β is calibrated to
an average asset correlation of ρ ≈ 0.3, unless indicated otherwise (cf. Equation (3)).
remaining (“peripheral”) risk factors to their optimal estimates conditional on the scenario.
Let βs denote the j < m core factor parameters that are stressed directly. The remaining m− j
peripheral risk factor parameters βu are affected by the stress scenario only indirectly. Under
the normal distribution setting above, it holds that the optimal estimator of ∆βu conditional
on ∆βs is (e.g. Theorem §13.2 of Shiryaev, 1996):
E(∆βu|∆βs) = ΣusΣ−1ss ∆βs,
where Σus and Σss denote the covariance and variance matrices of βu and βs.
Proposition 3. The portfolio variance when j of the β-risk factors coefficients are stressed by
∆β is given by
wᵀ Σ w =
σ2
n
(
1 + e−(β+∆β)
)j ·(1 + e−(β+ j·ρβ(j−1)ρβ+1∆β))m−j .
Proof. It is easily verified that the entries of the (m− j)× j-matrix ΣusΣ−1ss are
ρβ
(j − 1)ρβ + 1.
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To illustrate the impact of a correlation stress, we apply the above results to a portfolio
of n = 2m assets, where each asset has an annualised volatility of σ = 0.25 and the average
asset correlation in the portfolio is 0.3 unless specified differently. The risk factor coefficient
β is calibrated to reflect the target asset correlation for the number of factors m, e.g. with
m = 5 this is achieved by β = 0.5204 (cf. Equation (3)). Figure 1 shows that the portfolio
VaR decreases as a function of both the number of correlation risk factors m and the risk factor
coefficient β. Both results are not surprising as the increasing number of assets diversifies away
idiosyncratic risk leaving only systematic risk, which in addition, is lowered by an increasing
β. This result is driven by the long-only structure of the portfolio. The risk of a portfolio that
contains hedging positions may behave differently, as will be observed in the London Whale
example in Section 3.
The impact of changes in β to the overall portfolio VaR is shown in the top right graph of
Figure 1. For this long-only portfolio the VaR decays with decreasing correlation. The lower
boundary of 0 for β, i.e. a reduction of 100% in Figure 1, identifies the worst case scenario. The
impact of ∆β is asymmetric, where the risk of correlation changes is higher than the benefit.
Diversification benefits through changes in correlation are possible for diversified portfolios
under non-perfect correlation. For hedging portfolios, which often rely on very high or almost
perfect correlation, correlation changes are most often undesirable and considered a risk.
The steepness or sensitivity of VaR to changes in β is determined by the initial average
asset correlation, the correlation between risk factors, as well as the number of factors j ≤ m
that are initially stressed (see bottom graphs in Figure 1). In other words, an initially high
average asset correlation reduces the risk of changing correlations, because the portfolio is
already poorly diversified. The VaR impact when stressing a subset of j factors increases with
ρβ, which captures the dependence between correlation risk factors.
2.3 Joint stress test of correlation and volatility
It is well documented that large changes in correlation coincide with volatility shocks, e.g.
(Alexander and Sheedy, 2008b; Longin and Solnik, 2001; Loretan and English, 2000). To this
end, we develop a simple technique that combines both stress scenarios. The principal idea
is to assume that a d-dimensional vector of asset returns X follows a Student t-distribution,
X ∼ t(Σ˜, ν), with ν > 2 and with Σ˜ a matrix describing the dependence as explained further
below, where we assume for simplicity that expected asset returns are zero. Then, X follows
a normal variance mixture distribution with decomposition (cf. Chapter 6.2 of McNeil et al.
(2015))
X =
√
V ·A · Z,
where Z ∼ N(0, Ik), i.e., Z is a vector of independent standard normally distributed random
variables, V is independent of Z and V ∼ Ig(1/2 ν, 1/2 ν), i.e., the mixing variable V follows an
inverse gamma distribution, andA is a d×k matrix such that Σ˜ = AAT . Because of EV = ν
ν − 2,
the covariance matrix of X is Σ =
ν
ν − 2Σ˜ (note that the expectation and covariance matrix
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are defined only if ν > 2). The correlation matrices of X and AZ are the same.
Under the assumption of a t-distribution, the t-VaR at level α is, cf. Equation (1)
VaRtα = −tν,1−α · V0
(
wᵀ Σ˜ w
)1/2
= −tν,1−α · V0 ·
(
ν − 2
ν
)1/2
(wᵀ Σ w)1/2 . (4)
Volatility stress at the level α˜ ∈ [0, 1] is introduced by setting V to the α˜-quantile qα˜ of the
Ig(1/2 ν, 1/2 ν) distribution. This conveniently captures that the volatility stress induced is a
systematic event. Furthermore, the severity of the stress event depends on the heaviness of the
tails, expressed by ν. The VaR in this scenario is determined from
P
(
wTX ≤ VaRα|V = qα˜
)
= P
(√
qα˜w
TAZ ≤ VaRα
)
, (5)
with wTAZ ∼ N(0,wT Σ˜w). Consequently, the stressed t-VaR is derived from Equation (5)
as a normal distribution VaR with the standard deviation scaled according to the fixed mixing
variable contribution:
VaRtα,α˜ = −N1−α · V0 ·
√
qα˜(w
T Σ˜w)1/2 = −N1−α · V0 · √qα˜
(
ν − 2
ν
)1/2
(wTΣw)1/2. (6)
To achieve a joint volatility and correlation stress, both methods are combined: a scaling factor
determined from the quantile of the mixing variable as in Equation (6) is applied independently
of a correlation scenario ∆β as in Proposition 3.
2.4 Stress test scenario selection
2.4.1 Mahalanobis distance
When stress testing, aside from understanding the impact of given scenarios, one is also inter-
ested in the converse question: What is the worst scenario amongst all scenarios that occur
within some pre-given range? One way to specify the range is via the so-called Mahalanobis
distance, which measures the distance of a realisation of a normally distributed random vector
from its mean.
Recall that correlations ci,j are modelled as
cij = exp
(−(β1|x1i − x1j |+ β2|x2i − x2j |+ · · ·+ βk|xmi − xmj |)) , i, j = 1, . . . , n,
with positive parameters β1, . . . , βm. If β = (β1, . . . , βm)
ᵀ is a random vector with E(β) = β
and covariance matrix Σβ, then the Mahalanobis distance is defined as
D(β) =
(
(β − β)ᵀΣ−1β (β − β)
)1/2
.
Furthermore, if β ∼ N(β,Σβ), then the square of the Mahalanobis distance follows a chi-squared
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distribution, i.e., D2(β) ∼ χ2(m).3
We are interested in identifying the worst-case scenario β∗ that maximises VaR subject to
a constraint on the Mahalanobis distance:
β∗ = argmax
β:D2(β)≤h
VaRα(β),
where VaRα is given by Equation (1) with correlation matrix imposed by β. If the parameter
h in the constraint is chosen as the α∗-quantile of the χ2(m)-distribution, then β? expresses
the worst correlation scenario amongst all scenarios that lie on the inner ellipsoids covering a
probability of α∗. From Equation (1) it is obvious that maximising Varα does not depend on α
and is equivalent to maximising the variance. A trivial consequence is that β∗ also maximises
expected shortfall ESα =
1
1− α
∫ 1
α
VaRu du. Writing the diagonal matrix with the standard
deviations as the entries on the diagonal as σ = (diag(Σ(β)))
1
2 , gives
β∗ = argmax
β:D2(β)≤h
wᵀΣ(β)w = argmax
β:D2(β)≤h
wᵀ(σC(β)σ)w = argmax
β:D2(β)≤h
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wiwj σi σj cij(β).
The Lagrangian is
L = wᵀ(σC(β)σ)w + λ((β − β)ᵀΣ−1β (β − β)− h)
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wiwj σi σj cij(β) + λ
( m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(βi − βi)(βj − βj)qij − h
)
,
with qij the entries of Σ
−1
β .
The first-order conditions are
∂
∂βl
L = −
n∑
i,j=1
wiwjσiσje
−∑mk=1 βk|xki−xkj | · |xli − xlj |+ 2λ
m∑
j=1
(βj − βj)qlj = 0, l = 1, . . . ,m
(7)
∂
∂λ
L = D2(β)− h = 0 (8)
Assuming that all factors are indicators measuring if a property is present in both securities
3The approach can easily be extended to heavy-tailed distributions, by assuming that β follows an elliptic
distribution.
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or not, i.e., |xli − xlj | = 1{xli 6=xlj} gives
∂
∂βl
L = −e−βl
n∑
i,j=1
wiwjσiσje
−∑mk=1,k 6=l βk1{xk
i
6=xk
j
} · 1{xli 6=xlj}︸ ︷︷ ︸
=cl,1
+ 2λ
( m∑
j=1,j 6=l
(βj − βj)qlj
)
− 2λβlqll︸ ︷︷ ︸
=cl,2
+ 2λqll︸︷︷︸
=cl,3
βl
= −cl,1e−βl + cl,2 + cl,3βl = 0, l = 1, . . . , k (9)
∂
∂λ
L = D2(β)− h = 0 (10)
Assuming throughout that the factors are chosen in such a way that at least for one pair of
securities the respective indicator is 1 implies that cl,1 6= 0, for all l = 1, . . . , k.
Proposition 4. The solutions to (9) satisfy
β∗l = W
(
cl,1e
cl,2/cl,3
cl,3
)
− cl,2
cl,3
, l = 1, . . . , k,
where W (z) is the Lambert W -function (also called product logarithm), which gives the solution
for w in z = w ew, z ∈ C.
Proof. For ease of notation, we omit the index l, so we show that −c1 e−β + c2 + c3β = 0, with
β = W
(
c1e
c2/c3
c3
)
− c2
c3
. Setting w := W
(
c1e
c2/c3
c3
)
gives
−c1 e−(w−c2/c3) + c2 + c3(w − c2/c3) = −c1 e−(w−c2/c3) + c3w = 0,
which can be re-arranged to
− 1
w
e−w c1ec2/c3 + c3 = 0.
Using that
1
w
e−w =
c3
c1 ec2/c3
yields the claim.
2.4.2 Homogeneous portfolio analysis
To better understand the stress testing effect we consider a stylised, homogeneous portfolio as in
Section 2.2 and determine the worst stress scenario that lies within a pre-specified Mahalanobis
distance. As before, the m risk factors are binary and the number of securities is n = 2m
comprising all 2m risk factor combinations. The securities all have equal volatility, and the
portfolio is equally-weighted. The risk factor coefficients β are also assumed to be homogeneous,
i.e., they have identical means β, variances σ2β and correlations ρβ.
Proposition 5. In the homogeneous setting, the risk factor coefficients of the worst scenario
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within a given Mahalanobis distance
√
h are constant, i.e., β∗1 = · · · = β∗m = β∗, and given by
β∗ = β −
√
hσ2β(1 + (m− 1)ρβ)
m
.
Proof. Because of the binary risk factors, the first-order conditions (7) simplify to
∂
∂βl
L = −σ
2
n2
n∑
i,j=1
e
−∑mk=1 βk1{xk
i
6=xk
j
} · 1{xli 6=xlj} + 2λ
m∑
k=1
(βk − β)qlk = 0, l = 1, . . . ,m.
where qlk are the entries of Σ
−1
β and, because of the homogeneity of β, q11 = · · · = qmm and
qlk constant for all l 6= k. It is easily verified that q11 = (m− 2)ρβ + 1
(1 + (m− 2)ρβ − (m− 1)ρ2β)σ2β
and
q12 = − ρβ
(1 + (m− 2)ρβ − (m− 1)ρ2β)σ2β
.
For fixed l, the number of instances where 1{xli 6=xlj} = 1, i, j = 1, . . . , n, is n
2/2; in particular,
this number is constant regardless of the choice of l. Whenever 1{xli 6=xlj} = 1, then, across all
i, j, the number of terms where 1{xki 6=xkj } = 1 holds is equally distributed: the 2
m−1 terms, when
k 6= l, are the result of all combinations of m− 1 zeros and ones. As a consequence, the sums in
the first-order conditions have the same number of terms and would differ only in β1, . . . , βm;
however, because they all have the same structure it follows that β∗1 = · · · = β∗m = β∗. Hence,
the first-order conditions reduce to one condition, which is given by
∂
∂β
L = −σ
2
n
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
e−β·(1+k) + 2λ(β − β)(q11 + (m− 1)q12) = 0.
Because all β’s are equal, the worst stress scenario at a given Mahalanobis distance
√
h is one
of the two solutions of the quadratic equation
(β − β)ᵀΣ−1β (β − β) =
( m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(βi − βi)(βj − βj)qij
)
= (mq11 +m(m− 1)q12)(β − β)2 = h.
Solving for β gives
β = β ±
√
h
mq11 +m(m− 1)q12 = β ±
√
hσ2β(1 + (m− 1)ρβ)
m
.
The claim follows because the portfolio variance is monotone decreasing in β.
Obviously, ceteris paribus, the portfolio risk and VaR of the worst-case scenario increase with
the risk factor variance σ2β and the risk factor correlation ρβ. They decrease with increasing
number of risk factors, m. However, we will see in the examples below that if the initial β is
fitted from a given constant asset correlation matrix, then the worst-case scenario may increase
with the number of risk factors as well.
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Figure 2: Worst-case (within 95% probability deviation from mean) portfolio value-at-risk (VaR). Top
left: Initial and stressed one-day VaR (α = 0.99) with average asset correlation ρ = 0.3, annualised asset
volatility σ = 0.25, beta coefficient correlation ρβ = 0.1972 and beta standard deviation σβ = 0.1428.
Top right: Percentage increase in VaR for various parameter setups. Bottom left: Joint correlation and
volatility stress test as a function of ν, with volatility stress level α˜ = α = 0.99. Bottom right: VaR as
a function of the Mahalanobis constraint quantile.
In this setting, we consider a portfolio where the asset returns have an average correlation
of 0.3. With five β risk factor coefficients, this is achieved by β = 0.5204 (cf. Equation (3)). We
set ρβ = 0.1972 and σβ = 0.1428 (these values correspond to the historical averages from the
“London Whale” case described below). The 95% worst-case scenario is β = 0.2361. With an
annualised asset volatility of 0.25, the initial one-day 99%-VaR of 2.09% increases by 33% to
2.79%. Figure 2 shows the worst-case portfolio variance increase as a function of the number
of correlation risk factors m as well as for several parameter constellations. The bottom left
graph of Figure 2 shows the impact of a joint correlation and volatility stress scenario on a
one-day 99%-VaR. As laid out in Section 2.3, in addition to the correlation stress scenario,
volatility is scaled to a stress level corresponding to the α˜-quantile of a Student t-distribution,
cf. Equation (6), where we have chosen α˜ = α = 0.99. The volatility stress alone increases the
unstressed t-VaR by up to 51%, depending on the parameter ν of the t-distribution. Stressing
both correlation and volatility can add up to 102% to the unstressed t-VaR.
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3 Application to the “London Whale” portfolio
3.1 The “London Whale” case
In 2012, JPMorgan Chase & Co. reported a loss of approximately USD 6.2 billion on a credit
derivative portfolio that originated on the books of the comparably small Chief Investment Office
(CIO) in London. This case – known as the “London Whale” – was generated by an authorised
trading position, so, contrary to most other large trading losses, it cannot be attributed to
fraud or unauthorised trading. Interestingly, the loss took place at one of the world’s largest
investment banks, widely known for its advanced risk management, e.g. as the the innovator of
the widely recognised RiskMetrics and CreditMetrics frameworks (JPMorgan, 2013).
To understand JPMorgan’s strategy, trading and risk management of the loss generating
credit portfolio, we consolidate publicly available information on the London Whale. This
section presents our findings in a very concise format, a detailed review is available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210536.
JPMorgan, in its function as a lender, is naturally exposed to credit risk. In mid-2011,
JPM’s Chief Investment Office decided to establish a short credit position via its synthetic credit
portfolio (SCP), a portfolio of credit index derivatives.4 The initial purpose of the portfolio was
to act as a macro hedge that would offset naturally long credit exposure (JPMorgan, 2013,
p. 26). A similar strategy and portfolio was already successfully employed during the 2008–
2009 credit crisis. The decision to re-establish the portfolio was possibly influenced by the
deteriorating credit environment in Europe at that time.
The portfolio was based on the two major global credit derivative index families, the CDX
for the United States and the iTraxx for Europe.5 In addition to the indices, each comprising
a portfolio of 125 single-name credit default swaps (CDS), there exists a market of tranche
products, similar to synthetic collateralized debt obligations, with the indices as underlyings.
Both, the CDX and iTraxx provide different sub-indices, such as an Investment Grade index
(IG) and a High Yield index (HY). At some point, the SCP comprised more than 120 positions,
including most of the active indices and tranches. For details on the valuation of credit indices
and their tranche products, we refer to Appendix B and O’Kane (2008).
The proposed trading strategy was called “Smart Short” (United-States-Senate, 2013b, p.
51), which translates into a long-short strategy where credit protection on high yield indices
is financed by selling protection on investment grade indices. Hence, the upfront and flow
payments can be netted while the resulting portfolio is sensitive to changes in the market
spread between the two position sides.
By the end of 2011, JPMorgan’s senior management assessed an improvement of the global
credit environment, thus requiring less default protection. Hence the decision was made to
reduce the SCP’s risk weighted assets (RWA). The traders in charge estimated that a direct
4A short position in credit risk corresponds to buying CDS protection, i.e., the protection buyer receives
default insurance in return for a fixed premium. Thus, a deteriorating credit quality benefits the protection
buyer as a payout becomes more likely and hence, the position can be called a short credit risk position.
5The CDX and iTraxx index families are owned, managed, compiled and published by Markit Group Limited.
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liquidation of their positions would cost up to USD 590 million (see internal meeting documents
in United-States-Senate (2013a, Exhibit 8)). Faced by this number, the CIO management
decided against a direct reduction, in favour of “managing” profit and losses (P&L) while
gradually reducing RWA over time (JPMorgan, 2013, pp. 29 ff.).
A new trading strategy aimed at reducing RWA by increasing positions with opposite market
sensitivity. In order to comply with stress limits, the strategy was implemented by forward
spread trades, as was stated later during an interview with JPMorgan’s internal task force
(United-States-Senate, 2013b, p. 52). In the context of the SCP, forward spread trades meant
buying protection on short maturity indices, while selling protection on longer maturities. This
would hedge in the near term but generate credit exposure on the long term.
By the end of January 2012, after experiencing a loss of 50 million from the default of Kodak,
the traders where faced with three objectives: stemming the year-to-date (YTD) losses on the
SCP, reducing RWA and maintaining protection to prevent default losses (“Kodak moments”).
All objectives were addressed simultaneously by adding more positions to the portfolio, namely,
long risk positions to participate in the upward moving market, while generating carry to fund
the YTD losses and short risk positions. Additionally, protection was bought to create positive
P&L from Kodak type events. Therefore, the traders increased the size of both their long and
short positions.
On March 23, 2012, the CIO’s most senior executive ordered the traders to “put the phones
down”, i.e., to cease all related trading activities (United-States-Senate, 2013a, Exhibit 1i). At
this point, the SCP had a net notional of about USD 157 billion (United-States-Senate, 2013a,
Exhibit 1a), which was 260% up from the September 2011 net notional (and slightly more than
Vietnam’s 2012 GDP). The SCP’s top 10 positions as of March 23, 2012 are shown in Table 1.
Ceasing to trade meant, of course, that the traders could no longer influence P&L, and as a
consequence the losses on the SCP sky-rocketed.
Publicly available reports by JPMorgan’s internal task force (2013) and the United-States-
Senate (2013b) focus on management and organizational problems, position misreporting, mar-
ket manipulation, and spreadsheet-errors. This neglects that the classical risk measures em-
ployed might have been insufficient in their own right. To monitor the SCP, JPMorgan (2013)
primarily used the Value-at-Risk that would be reported in its 10-K filings. Cont and Wagalath
(2016) find that this risk measure was insufficient due to the size of the SCP, as it scales linearly
with position size and neglects market impact. In addition, the authors state that a correlation
decay, which was observable before the collapse of the portfolio, was possibly caused by the
SCP’s own market impact.
Aside from VaR, credit spread widening of 10% (CSW-10) is the second pivotal risk measure,
a sensitivity measure for the profit and loss impact of a simultaneous 10% increase in credit
spreads. JPMorgan’s traders relied heavily on this measure to balance their portfolio in a way
that offsetting positions would minimize the overall CSW-10 (JPMorgan, 2013).
However, a hedging strategy primarily based on a sensitivity measure, CSW-10 in this case,
ignores that correlation amongst the portfolio components may be imperfect. Value-at-risk takes
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Table 1: Top 10 Positions of the SCP as per March 23, 2012, reported in USD net notional and as
percentage share of the respective market. The market’s net notional is the net protection bought on an
index series by net buyers (or equivalently sold by net sellers) (DTCC, 2011). The publicly available data
is aggregated (net notional) and may not contain all live positions due to possible disclosure restrictions,
which explains the occurrence of values in excess of 100%.
Index
Name Series Tenor Tranche (%) Protection Net Notional ($) Share (%)
CDX.IG 9 10yr Untranched Seller 72,772,508,000 50.19
9 7yr Untranched Seller 32,783,985,000 22.61
9 5yr Untranched Buyer 31,675,380,000 21.85
iTraxx.EU 9 5yr Untranched Seller 23,944,939,583 37.01
9 10yr 22 – 100 Seller 21,083,785,713 22.04
16 5yr Untranched Seller 19,220,289,557 64.18
CDX.IG 16 5yr Untranched Buyer 18,478,750,000 78.92
9 10yr 30 – 100 Seller 18,132,248,430 50.35
15 5yr Untranched Buyer 17,520,500,000 117.01
iTraxx.EU 9 10yr Untranched Seller 17,254,807,398 26.67
Net Total 137,517,933,681
Data source: United-States-Senate (2013a, Exhibit 36) and DTCC (2014, Section 1, Table 7).
into account correlations, but to the best of our knowledge, potential changes in correlation were
ignored. As the SCP was a portfolio composed of a large number of offsetting positions that
are highly, but not perfectly dependent, correlation is easily seen to be a, if not the, crucial
risk driver. A change in the correlations, for instance amongst high-yield and investment grade
positions, amongst index and tranche positions, amongst CDX and itraxx positions, could easily
lead to large P&L swings.
The portfolio hedging alone is a strong indicator for the correlation dependence of the
SCP. Additionally, the size of the SCP and the resulting market-impact could have affected
correlation. It is therefore possible that on top of the normal variation in correlation, the
portfolio was exposed to more erratic changes that would be captured only by stress tests.
3.2 Correlation stress testing the “London Whale”
3.2.1 Correlation methodology
In the following, the sensitivity to various correlation scenarios of the SCP position is calculated
from historical data. The analysis is based on the portfolio composition of 23 March 2012, the
day when trading ceased. The historical data are provided by Markit and consist of daily CDX
and itraxx spreads and tranche data (spreads, upfront payments and base correlations) of the
series in place. Details on how the tranche data was transformed to credit spreads are given in
Appendix B.
As the main risk factors affecting correlation the following five properties are identified:
maturity, index series, investment grade (yes/no), CDX vs. itraxx, index vs. tranche. Informa-
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Figure 3: Correlation matrices of 23 March 2012. Left: Empirical correlation matrix; right: parame-
terised correlation matrix. The dark red entries are unavailable correlations due to insufficient data. The
three blocks of highly correlated data consist of (from top to bottom): CDX IG, CDX HY and iTraxx
securities.
tion about seniority of tranches was considered, but failed to provide useful results. Hence, the
correlation cij of credit spread returns of credit derivatives indexed by i and j is given by:
cij = exp
(− (β1|isCDXi − isCDXj |+ β2|isIGi − isIGj |+ β3|maturityi −maturityj |
+ β4|seriesi − seriesj |+ β5|isIndexi − isIndexj |)
)
. (11)
In the results provided below, all distance measures are normalised to [0, 1], which makes the
impact of the calibrated parameters comparable.
At any point in time t, the parameters β1, . . . , β5 are calibrated from the 250 credit spread
returns preceding day t. Daily parameters are calibrated starting from 1 March 2011 through 12
April 2012. The instruments entering the calibration are the 117 instruments identified to be in
the SCP portfolio on 23 March 2012. The precise set of instruments entering on each date differs
slightly through time for various reasons such as maturing instruments, spread availability, etc.
Figure 3 shows the empirical correlations and the calibrated correlations from Equation (11)
as of 23 March 2012. The calibrated coefficients β = (0.35, 0.37, 0.21, 0.05, 0.20)ᵀ indicate a
strong de-correlation amongst the regional property (CDX vs. itraxx) and the credit quality
(investment grade vs. high-yield), a lesser de-correlation amongst maturity and amongst index
vs. tranche product. The series-factor on the other hand provides a strong correlation.
The calibrated parameters for the whole time period (1 March 2011–12 April 2012) are
shown in Figure 4. The chart shows that the credit quality (investment grade versus high yield)
de-correlated over time, while the correlation differences driven by the region (CDX vs. itraxx)
decreased. Especially in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012, when strategic decisions regarding the SCP were
made, these were major drivers of correlation changes.
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Figure 4: Coefficients associated with correlation parameterisation of CDX and itraxx positions in
London Whale position; 01/03/2011–12/04/2012. All distances are normalised to [0, 1] to make the
coefficients comparable. Data source: Markit.
3.2.2 CDS portfolio risk
The risk of a CDS portfolio is expressed by value-at-risk (VaR) using the variance-covariance
approach, i.e., the portfolio change is approximated by a first-order Taylor approximation in the
credit spreads, and credit spread returns are assumed to be normally distributed. The portfolio
risk is then fully captured by the portfolio variance. To simplify notation, we omit the maturity
of a CDS contract and use the following notation related to CDS position i in a portfolio of n
CDS positions: si,t denotes the fair spread at time t, Ai is the notional amount of the position
and RPV01i,t is the risky PV01 at time t. Details, such as the calculation of RPV01i,t, are
given in Appendix A.
The portfolio value is then expressed as Vt =
n∑
i=1
Vi,t ≈
∑
i
Ai RPV01i,t (si,0 − si,t), where
Ai is positive for a short protection position and Ai is negative for a long protection position.
The portfolio P&L ∆V is approximated by spread returns in the following way:
∆V ≈ −
∑
i
Ai RPV01i,t−1 ∆si = −
∑
i
Ai RPV01i,t−1
∆si
si,t−1
si,t−1
= −
(∑
j
AjRPV01j,t−1 sj,t−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Vt−1
·
∑
i
wi ri,
where wi =
Ai RPV01i,t−1 si,t−1∑
j AjRPV01j,t−1 sj,t−1
denotes the percentage weight of the position in the port-
folio and ri =
∆si
si,t−1
denotes the spread return. For ease of notation, we write Vt−1 for the
linear approximation of the portfolio value.
Now, assuming that r = (r1, . . . , rn)
ᵀ ∼ N(0,Σ), i.e., spread returns are jointly normally
distributed with expectation 0 (a reasonable assumption for small time horizons) and covariances
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described by the n × n matrix Σ, the portfolio VaR is again given by the variance-covariance
approach, see Equation (1).
3.2.3 Results
On March 23, 2012 JPMorgan’s senior management ordered to cease all trading activities for
the SCP. The exact portfolio composition is known only for this day from publicly available
sources. To calculate risk figures for the SCP, the relevant credit index data is taken from
Markit and converted as necessary via the credit valuation model in Appendix A.
The approach uses historical data to fit parameters for both the P&L distribution and
the correlation model. After processing the data and excluding constituents with insufficient
observations, 93 constituents with a total net notional of USD 154.34 billion remain to be
included in the calculations. The unstressed delta-normal 1-day VaR at the 99% confidence
level is USD 339.32 million (base case), which is about twice as high as the VaR reported by
JPMorgan (2013, pp. 124 ff.). This number will be used as a benchmark for scenarios with
stressed correlations.
The problem of finding the constrained global maximum of VaRα(β) is solved numeri-
cally. To ensure robustness, first and second order conditions as well as different algorithms
are reviewed, including Nelder Mead, Differential Evolution, Simulated Annealing and Random
Search, all with the same result. In terms of computational time, Simulated Annealing appears
most efficient.
As laid out in Section 2.4.1, a plausibility constraint can be applied to the stress testing
method. For this application, where correlation parameters are assumed to follow a multivariate
normal distribution, this means considering only correlation scenarios that lie on or below a
quantile ellipsoid, which is determined by a Mahalanobis distance. Out of the set of feasible
scenarios, the one with the highest value at risk for a given quantile is reported in Table 2.
For the 99%-quantile constraint the (variance-covariance)-VaR is USD 381.08 million, which
corresponds to a 12.31% increase relative to the base case. This is a substantial increase given
that a daily VaR increase at the 99% level is expected to occur several times a year. The
worst case, which is unconstrained with respect to the Mahalanobis distance of the parameters,
produces a 1-day VaR of USD 620.96 million, which is 83.01% greater than the base case. These
results ignore changes from other risk factors, such as volatility, that would typically increase
in a downside scenario as well. In fact, its size makes the SCP especially vulnerable to other
factors, such as market liquidity issues and resulting plausible correlation scenarios that are not
reflected in historical data.
The results of a joint stress test capturing simultaneous changes in correlation and volatility
are also presented in Table 2. Here, the volatility stress level α˜ is set to the same quantile as
the Mahalanobis constraint. The parameter ν, which captures the heaviness of the tails of the
underlying return distribution, is determined by fitting a multivariate t-distribution to the 250
trading days of returns prior to March 23, 2012.6 With ν = 13.5, the unstressed t-VaR is already
6The parameter ν is fitted by a combination of matching the first two moments and maximum likelihood.
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Table 2: The SCP portfolio’s 1-day 99% value-at-risk for different Mahalanobis quantile constraints.
Percentage changes denote the relative distance to the base VaR, i.e., the VaR under the original setup
of March 23, 2012. The joint stress test captures simultaneous changes in correlation and volatility,
with percentage changes referring to the base t-VaR scenario. The heaviness of the tails of the return
distribution is calibrated to ν = 13.5. The volatility stress level α˜ for the joint stress test is set to the
quantile in column one.
correlation stress joint stress
Quantile VaR0.99 t-VaR0.99 Change(%) t-VaR0.99 Change(%)
base case 339.32 354.98 354.98
0.7 366.87 383.80 8.12 386.28 8.82
0.8 369.39 386.44 8.86 416.41 17.31
0.9 372.89 390.10 9.89 464.40 30.83
0.95 375.76 393.11 10.74 510.54 43.82
0.99 381.08 398.67 12.31 617.38 73.92
0.995 383.00 400.68 12.87 664.73 87.26
0.999 386.88 404.74 14.02 780.37 119.84
unconstrained∗ 620.96 649.62 83.00 1252.53 252.85
∗Unconstrained w.r.t. correlation changes; α˜ remains on the 0.999 level.
slightly higher than the normal VaR, i.e. USD 354.98 million instead of 339.32 million. The
joint stress t-VaR is roughly USD 617 million at the 99% confidence level, which corresponds
to a 73.92% increase over the unstressed t-VaR.
A correlation stress test would have enabled JPMorgan’s risk management to identify key
risk drivers and more appropriately assess the risks of its portfolio. Figure 5 shows box-plots for
the correlation parameters as well as the parameters as of 23 March 2012, and the worst case
parameters at a Mahalanobis constraint equivalent to 99%. All parameters, with the exception
of β2, which identifies whether an index is investment grade or high-yield, are stressed upwards,
hence, decorrelate. The slight downward shift of β2 can be attributed to a parameter increase
prior to the stress test.
Furthermore, Cont and Wagalath (2016) report a breakdown of correlation between CDX.IG.9
and CDX.IG.10 immediately after trading was halted in March 2012, when the CIO started to
sell its large positions (see CDX.IG.9 in Table 1), which ”is a signature of the market impact
of the CIO’s trading”. This structural break could not have been predicted by historical data,
which shows that the actual risk – owed to the size of the portfolio – was closer to the worst case
scenario than suggested by the plausibility constraints. In the unconstrained (worst-)case, the
parameter β4, capturing decorrelation between index series, appears as the major risk driver.
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Figure 5: Box-plots of correlation parameters. Dots indicate the observed parameters as of 23.03.2012,
crosses indicate the worst-case scenario under a 99%-quantile Mahalanobis distance constraint.
4 Concluding remarks and outlook
The dependence structure amongst portfolio components is of great relevance to the risk inherent
in a financial portfolio, and as such, correlation stress testing provides important information
about portfolio risk. The methodology developed in this paper maps risk factors to correlations,
which in turn allows to specify correlation stress test scenarios in terms of risk-factor changes.
In addition, worst-case risk-factor scenarios can be identified, yielding insights into the main
factors driving portfolio risks and potential losses. We derive analytical results that allow for
computing the value-at-risk impact both for given scenarios and for determining worst-case
scenarios.
To illustrate the method in a realistic setting, the correlation stress testing methodology is
applied to the case of the “London Whale”. This serves as an interesting case, because – in an
attempt to decrease the portfolio’s riskiness – the notional amount was increased significantly by
adding highly-correlated offsetting positions. Such a trading strategy is extremely vulnerable to
correlation changes and therefore lends itself to illustrating the importance of correlation stress
testing. Historical data suggests that, amongst the worst 1% of correlation scenarios, the 1-day
99%-VaR of the portfolio would have increased by 12% or more. Such a scenario is expected
to occur 2–3 times a year. The overall worst-case correlation scenario for the portfolio entails
a VaR increase of 83%. These are ceteris paribus results, isolating the effect of a correlation
change and neglecting that in reality large correlation changes would typically occur jointly with
volatility swings. A joint scenario where volatility and correlation are jointly stressed yields an
increase of 73.92% in the 99% t-VaR at a 99%-volatility stress leveland a worst-case increase in
VaR of 252.85%.
Correlation stress tests are particularly insightful on portfolios with large positions, as ad-
verse correlation moves may be triggered from the market impact of large trades. More specif-
ically, the ordinary co-movement of two or more assets may be disturbed by the market price
impact of large trades. Hence, an appropriate risk assessment of large portfolios must take into
account that a small risk footprint under conventional risk measures might be due to offsetting
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exposures, where only a correlation risk measure can reveal the true portfolio risk.
A further application of correlation stress testing as developed in this paper would be the
analysis of central counterparties (CCP), which clear exceptionally large financial portfolios.
Currently, 62% of the USD 544 trillion in notional outstanding of interest rate derivatives is
cleared through CCPs (Wooldridge, 2016). As part of their mandate and to protect them-
selves from the default of clients, CCPs use a margining system consisting of a variation margin
(daily mark-to-market settlement) and an initial margin (buffer to cover market losses follow-
ing a client’s default). To account for diversification benefits and to reduce clients’ clearing
costs, margins are typically calculated on a client’s netted position.7 The resulting margin
requirements may be highly correlation-sensitive. Moreover, adverse correlation scenarios may
affect many or even all clients, creating simultaneous margin calls to post additional collateral.
The correlation stress testing method developed here is capable of identifying these kinds of
systemic risk events. In addition, correlation stress testing on the clearing client side would
provide insights on possible future margin requirements and the resulting collateral funding
risk.
A Credit default swap valuation
Given an underlying entity (e.g. a sovereign or a company), a credit default swap (CDS) is a
contract between two counterparties, the protection buyer and the protection seller, that insures
the protection buyer against the loss incurred by default of the underlying entity within a fixed
time interval. The protection buyer regularly pays a constant premium, the credit spread or
CDS spread, which is fixed at inception, up until maturity of the CDS or the default event,
whichever occurs first. This stream of payments is termed the premium leg of the CDS. In
return, the protection seller agrees to compensate the protection buyer for the loss incurred by
default of the underlying entity at the time of default in case this occurs before maturity. This
constitutes the protection leg of the CDS. The CDS spread that makes the value of the premium
leg and the protection leg equal is the fair CDS spread .
More precisely, let r > 0 denote the default-free interest rate, assumed to be constant
for simplicity. Furthermore, assume that the payment at default is a fraction (1 − R) of the
notational amount, R ∈ [0, 1). The probability of default of the underlying entity at time t
until time T is denoted by P (t, T ); this probability is conditional on any information available
until time t. Denote by s(t, T ) the fair credit spread at time t of a CDS with maturity T .
Here, we follow the convention that entering into a CDS involves no initial cash-flow, that is,
the market value of a CDS at inception is 0. Even though CDS are nowadays traded with an
upfront payment, this still corresponds to the common quoting convention. In other words, the
discounted fair values of the premium and the default legs are equal. In addition, to simplify
the exposition and notation, we assume that credit spreads are paid continuously instead of
quarterly. From the point of view of a protection seller, the value of a CDS contract entered at
7Similar offers are found for almost any financial service provider that employs a margining system, e.g. brokers
and future exchanges.
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time t is given via risk-neutral pricing by the value of the premium leg minus the value of the
protection leg. Combining this with the fact that the initial value of the CDS is 0 gives:
0 = s(t, T )
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t) (1− P (t, u)) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
=RPV01
−(1−R)
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t) P (t,du),
or, re-arranging for the spread,
s(t, T )
1−R =
∫ T
t e
−r(u−t) dP (t, u)∫ T
t e
−r(u−t) (1− P (t, u)) du
. (12)
The term RPV01 denotes the risky present value of a basis point. For a full derivation we refer
to e.g. Chapter 6 of O’Kane (2008).
The mark-to-market value of an existing CDS position is expressed as the cost of unwinding
the transaction by entering into an offsetting CDS position. In the following we assume a CDS
contract with maturity T and notional $1 entered at time 0 ≤ t from the point of view of the
protection seller. Conditional on no-default at time t, the value of the position at time t is
Vt = s(0, T )
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t) (1− P (t, u)) du− (1−R)
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t) P (t,du)
= (s(0, T )− s(t, T ))
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t) (1− P (t, u)) du = (s(0, T )− s(t, T )) RPV01(t, T ).
Here we have used that the values of the premium and protection legs of the time-t CDS are
equal.
A simplification of the valuation occurs by assuming that, similar to a constant interest rate,
the default probabilities are subject to a constant hazard rate λt > 0, i.e., P (t, T ) = 1−e−λt(T−t),
T ≥ t. The credit spread formula (12) reduces to the so-called credit spread triangle,
s(t, T )
1−R = λt, (13)
and the RPV01 is then expressed as
RPV01(t, T ) =
∫ T
t
e−(r+λt)(u−t) du =
∫ T
t
e−(r+s(t,T )/(1−R))(u−t) du. (14)
For value-at-risk calculations, it is useful to approximate the P&L ∆V by a first-order Taylor-
approximation on the spread change ∆s = s(t, T )− s(t− 1, T ):8
∆V = Vt − Vt−1 ≈ ∂
∂s
Vt−1 ·∆s
= −RPV01(t− 1, T ) ·∆s+ (s(0, T )− s(t− 1, T )) · ∂
∂s
RPV01(t− 1, T ) ·∆s.
8Assuming that ∆t is small, we ignore the change due to time-decay.
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The second term involves a product of spread changes and is therefore smaller, so we shall
ignore it for ease of computations, giving
∆V ≈ −RPV01(t− 1, T ) ·∆s.
B Tranche spread calculation
This appendix gives a brief outline of the calculation of fair spreads of credit index tranches
required for estimating the β-parameters of the “London Whale” portfolio. The calculations
are based on O’Kane (2008). For tranches, the given market data consists of running spreads,
upfront payments and base correlations. To make all calculations involving both index and
tranche positions consistently use spread time series, the tranche data are transformed into
financially equivalent fair spreads without upfront payment.
The present value of an index tranche with attachment point K1, detachment point K2 and
maturity T is given by (cf. O’Kane, 2008, Equation (20.1)):
PV(K1,K2) = U(K1,K2) + S(K1,K2)
∫ T
0
Z(t)Q(t,K1,K2) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=RPV01
−
∫ T
0
Z(t)(−dQ(t,K1,K2)),
where U(K1,K2) is the upfront spread that is paid at inception of the trade, S(K1,K2) is
the running spread that is paid regularly (continuously in the case considered), Z(t) = e−rt
is the time-t discount factor and where Q(t,K1,K2) denotes the tranche survival probabil-
ity. The expression
∫ T
0 Z(t)Q(t,K1,K2) dt denotes the risky present value of a basis point
(RPV01) and
∫ T
0 Z(t)(−dQ(t,K1,K2)) corresponds to the value of the protection leg that
pays in case of default. The financially equivalent spread without an upfront payment sat-
isfies s = U(K1,K2)/RPV01 + S(K1,K2), so the calculation reduces to calculating the tranche
survival curve Q(t,K1,K2), t ∈ [0, T ].
Assuming m contiguous tranches, the survival probabilities Q(T, 0,K1), Q(T,K1,K2), . . . ,
Q(T,Km−1,Km) can be calculated iteratively from the expected tranche losses for each tranche
(cf. O’Kane, 2008, pp. 378), which in turn are calculated from the base correlations and the
index survival probability in a one-factor Gaussian latent variable model (cf. O’Kane, 2008, pp.
305–307).
Finally, the survival probabilities need to be calculated for t ∈ [0, T ]. Market convention
holds that the quoted index spread corresponds to a flat term structure (O’Kane, 2008, p.
190). Making the same assumption for the tranche spread s, the hazard rate λ entering tranche
survival probabilities QT = e
−λT is determined via the so-called credit triangle λ = s/(1− R),
giving tranche survival probabilities Qt = e
−λt. The RPV01 is then calculated as∫ T
0
Z(t)Q(t,K1,K2) dt =
∫ T
0
e−(r+λ) dt =
1− e−(r+λ)T
r + λ
.
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